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Two cons~deratlons motivated the research which u~derlfes this paper.
The first was the desire to understand what has happened to Brazil and Mexico -
two countries that after rather successful growth experiences over substantial
periods of time have become the foci of international attention as they
exper~enced foreign debt and liqu~dity crises of unusual magnitude and threatened
to bring the international flnanclal system
heads. The second was the desire to better
national economic system and how It affects
Individual countries,
down around all our collective
understand the emerging lnter-
the economic performance of
Brazil and Mexico are two rather different economies, yet the sources of
their respective difficulties have some important commonalltles. Brazil
represents the epitome of autarchlc development, having pursued lmport-
subst~tuting lndustrlallzatlon pollcies with a particular vengeance for
approximately 30 years. As a consequenceof those pollcles it has one of
the most closed, if not the most closed economy of the world. Exports are
*
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equlvalent to approximately 8 percent of GDP.
Mexico has also pursued Import subst~tutlng mdustrlallzatlon, but not
qmte with the same xntenslty as Brazil. Moreover, in contrast to Brazil,
Mexico discovered large 011 reserves at a t~me when It could extract signi-
ficant economic rents from the international community by exploiting that
scarce resource. Despite that good fortune, Mexico still has suffered a
severe crlsls due to lts difficulties In servicing Its International debt.
In both cases, external observers have blamed the d~fflcult~es of each
country on a failure to llve wlthln their means, excess optimism, and bad
pollcy. Observers within the countries, on the other hand, have blamed
their difficulties on external conditions - and in particular on t~ght U.S.
monetary pollcles.
The theme of this paper IS that both countlres have a very real sense
been vlctlmlzed by changes m the International system that are as of yet
poorly understood. Clearly, misjudgments about policy and institutional
arrangements contr~buted Importantly to the problems each country has
experienced, and especially to the severity of their respective crises. It
1s an open question, however, whether more rational pollc~es would have
enabled either country to escape entirely the dlff~cult~es they have
experienced.
In the case of both countries, we WI1l provide some evidence that
domestic pollcles dlscr~m~nated against agriculture prior to the crisis of the
early 1980’s. Had different trade and exchange rate pollcies been In effect,
the external shocks to the agriculture of each country and to Its respective
economy as a whole m~ght have been significantly less.
A secondary theme of my paper is that international lnstltutlons and
polltlcal arrangements have not kept up with the degree of international-
ization of the world’s economy. In llght of these deflclencles, It-3-
1s an open question whether any country can escape significant adjustments
when the magnitude of the external shocks are so great. The challenge to
economists, pol~tlcal sclentlsts, and polltlcal leaders is to design insti-
tutional arrangements that provide for better management of the lnter-
natxonal economy. This will not be easy given the strength with which
nat~onalistic values still dom~nate the International economy. In any case,
domestic monetary pollcy and International monetary condxtlons have
become Important components of the world food pollcy scene. Moreover,
monetary policy 1s now an important part of the publlc decisions which
private decmlon makers have to take Into account.
My paper 1s d~v~ded into four parts. The first part contains a brief
review of recent changes in the structure of the international economy.
The second part briefly reviews the recent experience of Brazil In Its
relatlons to the International economy, while the third part d~scusses
Mexico’s experience. The fourth section discusses some of the ~nst~tut~onal
and policy lmpllcatlons that follow from the previous three sections. At
the end I w1ll have some concluding comments.
Changes In the Structure of the International Economy
The last 15 to 20 years have witnessed unprecedented changes m the
structure and ~nstitutlonal arrangements of the international economy.
These changes affect in Important ways how individual econom~es relate to
each other. They alter in fundamental ways the impact of macroeconomic
pol~cles on individual countries. And they alter the extent of andquali--4-
tative dimensions of economic Integration on the international scene.
Some of these changes are of substantial significance to international
commodity markets. Some are also of great significance to countries like
Brazil and Mexico which in the past have integrated themselves Into the
International economy in particular ways.
Increased Dependence on Trade
The world has become increasingly well-integrated through trade during
the post-World War II period. With the exception of three years, inter-
national trade has grown at a faster rate than has world GNP. Two of those
three years were 1981 and 1982, a period which witnessed the most severe
economic recession of the post-World War II period.
That international trade has grown at a faster rate than world GNP
means that many if not most countries have become increasingly dependent on
International trade. Put somewhat differently, this means that the
countries of the world have become increasingly open to trade. In the case
of the United States, this change has become very significant. During the
1970’s, the openness of the U.S. economy approximately doubled. Considering
only agriculture, for example, the share of demand that derived from trade
increased from 12.7 percent in 1970 to 26.7 percent in 1979.1 Measured In
terms of the share of cash marketing attributed to foreign markets, the
lSee Tweeten, Luther, “Excess Farm Supply: Permanent or Transitory?”, paper
presented at National Agricultural Policy Symposium, March 28, 1983, Kansas
City, Missouri.-5-
percent increased from about 12.5 percent in 1970 to 25 percent in 1979. By
1981 this share was up to over 30 percent.
Other parts of the U.S. economy are not as dependent on trade as is
agriculture, but the rest of the economy also became more open during this
same period. Hence, the general dependence on trade of the U.S. economy as
a whole also doubled during the 1970’s, from about 6.5 percent to about 12.5
percent. If one extends the per~od backward only five years (to 1965), the
openness of the lJ.S.economy as a whole tripled.
Brazil continues to be one of the most closed economies of the world,
with exports being equivalent to only approximately 8 percent of GDP. To
pay lts much enlarged foreign debt, however, It will undoubtedly be forced
to open its economy, and now appears to be doing so.
The growth In Mexican petroleum exports during the latter half of the
1970’s and early 1980’s undoubtedly Increased the openness of its economy.
Moreover, an Important aspect of the openness of the Mexican economy is the
large migratory flow of labor with the United States - a flow that may well
be glvxng Mexico a structure of factor prices more consistent with an advanced,
~ndustr~al~zed country than with a less-developed country.
F~nally, It should be noted than an important consequence of a more
open economy 1s that a larger and larger share of Its economic activities
are beyond the reach of domestic econom~c policies. This is an important
source of frustration to policy makers In many countries. It is a point to
which we will return below.-6-
Emergence of a Well-Integrated International Capital Market
International capital markets at the end of World War II were debzll-
tated and virtually nonexistent. Such transfers of capital as there were
among countries were on a government-to-government basis, and they were
called foreign aid. At one time such transfers were fairly slgnlflcant.
At the peak of the Marshall Plan, for example, the U.S. transferred capital
equivalent to more than 3 percent of Its GNP per year to Western Europe for
reconstruction of Its economy.
In the 1960’s there emerged a Eurodollar market which grew at a very
rapid rate. Later, the base of this market broadened to be a Eurocurrency
market. The volume of credit in this market is now huge - recent estimates
put the total amount of credit outstanding at U.S. $1.7 trillion. More-
over, this market is almost completely outside direct government control In
the sense that it is completely unregulated.
Almost all countries use this International capital market. The U.S.
the
and other Lndustrlallzed countries use it. The less-developed countries use it.
And even the centrally-planned countries use It. The market enables all these
individual countries to gain access to funds, which may be mobilized by
Indlvldual banks or consortia of banks.
The important thing about this market is that lt llnks the national
economies of the world in ways that are every bit as important as the llnkages
through trade. Equally as important, It links the economic policles of the
various countries of the world together.-7-
Some aspects of this International capital market are now well recognized,
especially as a source of capital. Brazlllans, for example, well recognize
that the price they have to pay for capital is determined in this market, and
that disturbances in this market can well disturb their own economy. What is
less well-recognized 1s that In light of the shift from a system of fixed
exchange rates to a system of flexible exchange rates, this international
capital market also provides an Important link between monetary policy in a
country such as the United States and international commodity markets. This,
point w1ll be further elaborated below.
The Shift From a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime to a System of Flexlble
Exchange Rates
At the Bretton Woods ConventIon In 1944 It was agreed that the inter-
national monetary system would operate at the end of the war with, among other
things, a system of f~xed exchange rates. Once these exchange rates were agreed
to, they were to be changed only under dire circumstances. Imbalances in
external accounts were to be corrected by changes In domestic pollcies.
Deficits in the external accounts, for example, were to be corrected by purgulng
tighter monetary and fiscal policles. Surpluses, on the other hand, were to be
reduced by stimulating the economy. The same applied to domestic imbalances
such as inflation or unemployment.
This fixed exchange rate system was established in part to avoid
beggar-thy-neighbor competitive devaluations, which many observers believed-8-
contributed to the severity and world-wide scope of the Great Depression.
This system served at least the industrialized countries of the world
reasonably well for a period of almost 30 years. However, the United States
learned during the 1960’s that it could finance the Vietnamese War and
expand domestic social programs by imposing an inflation tax on the rest of
the International economy. The U.S. dollar consequently became increasingly
overvalued while other currencies, especially the German Deutschmark and the
Japanese Yen, became increasingly undervalued.
Other countries of the world thought the U.S. should devalue, while the
U.S. thought Germany and Japan should revalue their currencies. After a
polltlcal impasse, the U.S. finally devalued the dollar m 1971. When this
dld not elimlnate Its balance of payments deficits as expected, the U.S.
devalued again in 1973, closed its gold window, and forced the world to a
system of floatlng exchange rates, which is the system that prevails still
today.
As the system now operates It might best be described as a system of
bloc floatlng. A fairly large number of countries, lncludlng Brazil and
Mexico, keep the value of their currencies pegged in one form or another to
the value of the dollar. Others keep their currencies pegged to the value
of the French franc, and still others to the pound sterllng. However,
although a currency such as the Brazilian cruzerio may be pegged to the
value of the U.S. dollar, it will float vis-a-vls other currencies as the
value of the dollar floats vis-a-vis those other currencies. Hence,-9-
although there is a degree of “fixlty” in the system, there is also a great
deal of flexibility. Recent estimates Indicate that approximtltely 85 per-
cent of world trade has been taking place across flexible exchange rates.
This shift to a system of flexible exchange rates was a very significant
change in the structure of the International economy and how i.toperates, espe-
cially In llght of the emergence of a well-integrated International capital
market. It was also of major significance to lndlvldual countries, since It
changed m a very slgnlflcant way the way in which changes In monetary pollcy
affect the economy. ‘Theslgnlflcance of these changes IS not sufficiently well
recognized.
We can illustrate these changes by considering the case of the U.S.,
a country that is of considerable trade importance to both Brazil and
Mexico. Suppose the U.S. decides to slow down Its economy. It can do that
by pursuing a tight monetary policy. Prior to the changes in the structure
of the International economy we have been considering, the effect of this
tight monetary policy would have been felt rather broadly in the economy In
the form of higher Interest rates. Under the new structure, that no longer
IS the case. As Interest rates start to rise, capital flows into the
country (or flows out at a lower rate) and this in turn causes a rise in
the value of the dollar. A rise In the value of the dollar causes U.S.
exports to be less competitive in foreign markets and therefore chokes off
the export sectors. A rise In the value of the dollar also causes Imports
to come In at lower prices in terms of the domestic currency, with the-1o-
result that the domestic import competing sectors are also choked off.
The monetary authorities have accomplished what they wanted to do.
However, under the new international structure, the burden of the adjustment
IS forced onto a fairly narrow part of the economy, with agriculture as an
export sector having to bear an important part of the adjustment. If the
monetary authorities decide, on the other hand, to stimulate the domestic
economy, they w1ll pursue an easy monetary policy, interest rates will tend
to decline, capital WL1l flow out of the country, the value of the dollar
will decline, exports will be stimulated and so will import-competing sec-
tors since imports will become more expensive In terms of the domestic eco-
nomy. Aga&n, the monetary authorities accomplish what they want to do, but
a fairly narrow sector of the economy is bearing the costs.
This change in the system has been of very great significance to U.S.
agriculture. As we w~ll show below, It 1s also a very great significance
to the agriculture of other countlres such as Brazil and Mexico. In the
case of the U.S., agriculture went from being a sector of the economy that
was virtually completely Isolated from shifts in monetary policy, to a
situation in which lt has to bear an important share of the burden of adjust-
ment to shifts in monetary policy. This lS of very great significance when
it comes to dev~sing proper domestic commodity policies and programs, both in
the U.S. and elsewhere.
Increase in Monetary Instability
My own inclination in discussing this topic is to put the emphasis on
the s~gnlf~cant increase In U.S. monetary instability. After all, U.S.-11-
monetary pollcy did become significantly more unstable starting in about
1968, and the world is essentially on a dollar standard.2 During the 1950’S
and the 1960’s, U.S. monetary POIICY was quite stable, as was the U.S.
economy.
My colleagues and frzends in the banking community don’t like for me to
put all the blame on U.S. monetary authorltles, however. They point out,
and perhaps properly so, that there have been slgnlflcant exogenous shocks
from the international community as short-term capital funds have sloshed
around the international system seeking the highest rate of return and haven
from political instab~llty. And perhaps the real source of our difficulty
IS the emergence of the well-integrated international capital markets, which
make It possible for funds to move around with relative ease.
For our purposes here it matters only in limited ways where the source
of the monetary shocks was located. The important.points seem to be as
follows. Starting in about 1968, U.S. monetary pollcy dld become very
unstable. Periods of extreme monetary tightness have alternated with
per~ods of extreme monetary ease. Real interest rates in U.S. money markets
have vacillated from periods in which they were szgnlflcantly negative In
real terms to periods in which they were at record-high levels both in nomi-
nal and real terms. This pollcy has been characterized by its critics as
stop-and-go, zig-zag, and a few other euphemistic expressions,,
2McKinnon, R. I., “Currency Substltutlon and Instability In the World Dollar
Market”, American Economic Review 72(3): 320-333 (June 1982).-12-
This instability in U.S. monetary policy has been exacerbated by other
developments. First, there was a significant Infusion of international
reserves into the system In the early 1970’s by the creation of SDR’S.
Second, although the world essentially went off the last remnants of the
gold standard in 1968, the wild gyrations m the price of gold since 1973
have undoubtedly Imposed significant shocks on the international monetary
system. Third, the huge generation of petrodollars when OPEC raised the
price of oil in 1973 and again in 1979 undoubtedly added to international
monetary instability.
Whatever the source of the monetary disturbances, It 1s clear that they
occurred In a significantly changed international system. At the very time
the structure of the international economy had changed so that monetary
pollcy and monetary conditions affected domestic economies by Inducing
changes In the export- and import-competing sectors, these factors became
quite unstable. This Increase In monetary instability has imposed large
monetary disturbances on international commodity markets. What has widely
been interpreted as weather shocks - as If we hadn’t had weather before -
was in large part, although not entirely, due to a significant increase In
monetary Instability in the context of a changed structure of the inter-
national economy that caused that instability to be translated to inter-
national commodity markets.-13-
These commodity markets Include more than agricultural products, as
U.S. automobile and textile workers can well attest. Our focus for present
purposes will tend to focus on agricultural commodity markets, however.
Implications of this Changed System for Brazi13
These changes In the International system are of great Importance for a
country such as Brazil, especially when combined with other institutional
arrangements that are an important part of the znternatlonal agricultural
economy. The implications to Brazil In terms of credit itself have been
widely recognized, especially in light of Brazil’s very large foreign debt,
much of It held with variable interest rates. The more general and perhaps
equally as important implications in terms of commodity markets lS less seldom
recognized. It IS to these Issues that I now turn.
Perhaps the best way to analyze the implications of this changed economic
environment for Brazil IS to first assume that it had a float]ng exchange
rate, and then to consider the consequences of keeping the value of
the cruzelro more or less pegged to the value of the dollar. It is important
to recognize that the changes impact Brazil’s agricultural sector both as a
competitor of the U.S. In some foreign markets and as an exporter of tropical
products both to the United States and to other countries.
3Thls section is taken from a paper I prepared for the World Bank, “Food and
Agriculture Price Pollcy In Brazil: Some Selected Topics,” December 7, 1983.-14-
Conslder first the case assuming that the cruzeiro/U.S. dollar exchange
rate were flexible. Further, recognize that in the period since 1973 there
have been two large swings In the value of the dollar ~n foreign exchange
markets (see Figure 1). The first was the very large decline - roughly 28-30
percent in real terms from Its first devaluation In 1971 to its low point in
1980. This was followed by an equally large rise in the period 1980-83,
which was approximately of the same amount Ln real terms as the previous
decllne. In fact, this large rise was the second largest rise in the value of
an Industrialized country’s currency In history - second only to rise In the
value of the pound sterling after the opening of the North Sea 011 fields and
Margaret Thatcher’s tight monetary policies.
It IS mportant to understand what caused these large swings in the value
of the dollar since it illustrates how factors traditionally viewed as “foreign”
to agriculture can have a significant impact on it in the new economic
environment. Two factors explaln a large part of the decline in the value of
the dollar in the 1970’s. The first was the petroleum crisis and the U.S.
response to It. The second was U.S. monetary pollcy.
In terms of the petroleum or energy crisis, the U.S. failed until 1980
to pass the significant increases in these prices into the domestic economy.
The domestic petroleum industry was highly regulated, with domestic prices fixed
In an economy that was experiencing lnflatlon. Consequently, domestic producers
of petroleum had very llttle incentive to increase production and domestic con-








centlve Imposed by queuing and the value of their time. In effect, the U.S.
was implicitly subsidizing the importation of petroleum at the very time Its
price In International markets rose dramatically. This caused the U.S. import
bill for petroleum to burgeon.
On the side of monetary policy, the sltuatlon was equally infelicitous.
Inflatlon was out of control and U.S. monetary policy was quite erratic. There
was a general fleeing from the dollar as U.S. monetary authorities monetized
the debt created by budget deflclts.
Starting m about 1980, however, both of these conditions changed. First,
one of the first things President Reagan dld after assuming the presidency was
to deregulate (almost, but not completely) the petroleum industry. Domestic
prices rose to border price levels, with the result that consumers had strong
~ncentlves to economize on their use of energy and producers had strong
incentives to explore for new sources and to increase production. In a
short period of time this change In pollcy led to a world petroleum glut.
Most Importantly, it caused the U.S. petroleum Import bill to decllne
dramatically, which contributed in an important way to the strength of the
U.S. dollar In the early 1980’s.
On the monetary side, starting in October 1979 the Federal Reserve stopped
monetizing the debt created by the deficits in the federal budget, and began
pursuing a tight monetary policy. The result was interest rates that peaked at
record levels in the first half of 1980, declined in mid-year as the monetary
brakes were released, but peaked again at a new high in 1981. They have since-16-
declined in nominal terms, but in real terms they are still at very high levels.
The most severe economic recession of the post-World War II period has been the
result. This recession has affected international commodity markets in Its own
right. But the realignments In exchange rates associated with it have been as
important, If not more Important, then the period of economic slack, especially
for countries such as Brazil.
Let’s consider now the consequences of the realignments in the exchange
rate. The fall In the value of the dollar in the 1970’s led to an unprecedented
export boom for the United States, dramatically Illustrated by agriculture but
equally as important for exports from other sectors (see Figure 2). The
United States capitalized on its comparat~ve advantage in agriculture and
other products. In dollar terms, the price of U.S. commodities rose slgni-
flcantly. In terms of the currencies of other countries, however, they
declined. Had the value of the cruzelro been floatln~ at that time, Brazil
would undoubtedly have had a difficult time
more than llkely would have had a dlfflcult
national market for orange Juice.
competing with U.S. soybeans and
time penetrating the lnter-
The fall In the value of the dollar also made Imports to the U.S. more
expensive In terms of the domestic economy. This IS Important because,
although the U.S. lS the world’s largest exporter of agricultural commodltles,
It is also one of the largest Importers - generally second only to Germany.
Had the cruzelro been floating relative to the dollar, its exports of tropical














































products in Brazil also would have declined.
The rise In the value of the dollar in the early 1980
opposite effect. The U.S. lost a great deal of Its compet.
s has had Just the
tlve edge In inter-
national commodity markets (see Figure 2). Moreover, prices in those inter-
national markets have been translated into the domestic economy at relati-
vely low levels. This has created a serious farm problem, exacerbated by
rigid domestic commodity programs which have priced U.S. products even
further out of international markets, provided strong incentives to produ-
cers In other countries to produce, provided a price umbrella for producers
In other countries, and precluded proper adjustment at home. The result has
been a significant loss in market share for the U.S., and a large accumula-
tion of stocks at home.
If the cruzeiro had been floating vis-a-vis the dollar at this time,
Brazil would have benefited In a relatlve sense on products it exports in
competition with the U.S. such as soybeans, orange Juice, poultry and to a
lesser extent corn. Slmllarly, It would have benefited on the side of tropical
products which It exports directly to the U.S., since the rise In the value of
the dollar causes imports to be cheaper In terms of the domestic economy. The
Increase in the quantity demanded of these products would have led to larger
exports on the part of Brazil and higher prices for Braz~llan producers.
Now, consider the fact that for all practical purposes the value of the
cruzelro has been pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar. This pegging has
not been rlgld, since Brazil has for some time been using a crawling peg-18-
exchange rate system. But in a general sense the value of the cruzeiro has
been tied to the value of the U.S. dollar.
Interestingly enough, Brazil benefited from this system during the
1970’s when the value of the dollar was weak. In terms of products which
It exports in competition with the U.S., such as soybeans, It dld not gain
relative to the U.S. But it dld gain relative to other countries whose
currencies were rising In relatlon to the dollar, and In relatlon to
countries whose currencies were tied to currencies that were rising In
relatlon to the dollar. Similarly, the lack of a significant realignment
of the cruzeiro vis-a-vis the dollar in this period meant that the decllne
In the value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets did not choke off
imports from Brazil of tropical products. Hence, Brazil benefited in terms
of both categories of Its exports.
Data on the nominal and real cruzelro/dollar exchange rate are presented
in Table 1. One can observe that in real terms this rate was maintained rela-
tively stable during the 1970’s, with the result that relative to other
currencies, the value of the cruzeiro declined as the value of the dollar fell
(see Figure 1).
In the period in which the value of the dollar has been rising,
however, the consequences have been Just the opposite, and of considerable
importance to Brazil.
of the current crisis,
obligations. When the
In fact, it probably helps to explaln a great deal
and the Inability of Brazil to meet Its foreign debt


































































































SOURCE : W, International Financzal Staclstzcs.
~’See footnote l_/, Table 1.-19-
was carried with it. Moreover, the cruzeiro in this period became increasingly
overvalued relative to the dollar, even though its value declined relative
to the dollar, (see Table 1). Hence, rather than to experience a stronger
competitive position in those products which Brazil exports in competition
with the United States, it lost that potential gain. Moreover, it became
less competitive In relation to third countries.
Slmllarly, rather than to experience an Increase In demand for tropical
products from the U.S. economy as the value of the dollar rose, the tying
of the cruzeiro to the dollar also precluded that. This problem was exacer-
bated by the serious recession in the U.S., which caused domestic demand to
be weak.
Understanding these consequences of changes in the structure of the
international economy and in the exchange rate realignments helps to
understand a great deal of recent BrazilIan economic history. In looking
back, Brazil really had little choice but to undertake a significant deva-
luation of the cruzelro back in 1973 when the price of petroleum first rose.
It was able to get by without doing that because its currency was tied to the
dollar and the dollar itself decllned significantly in value. Brazil bene-
fited from that decline and therefore was able to get along with stop-gap
measures and a revitalization of the drive for import-substitution, which it
once again pursued with a vengeance.
When the second rise In petroleum prices came in 1979, Brazil was not
so fortunate. The U.S. undertook economic measures which moved its economy-20-
back towards an efficiency expansion path, with the result that there was a
dramatic rise in the value of the dollar. In contrast, In Brazil, economic
pollcy was deteriorating, But since the value of Its currency was tied to
the value of the dollar, It rose relative to currencies in the rest of the
world. Consequently, Brazil tied Its own economic hands. At the very time
that lt could have capitalized on the international economy due to the great
rise In the value of the dollar, It kept itself from taking advantage of this
opportunity. The first maxidevaluation (zn 1979) was tacit recognition of
this sltuatlon and an attempt to take advantage of the new situation.
However, follow-up economic pollcles were inadequate, so the benefits of the
devaluation were quickly eroded.
In a very real sense It can be said that Brazil has suffered very large
shocks from the international economy. By the same token, however, with a
different set of economic pollcles and lnstltutlonal arrangements, Brazil
could have isolated itself from these shocks. To put It In even stronger
terms, Brazil could have capitalized on the great rise in the value of the
dollar - not without some slzeable costs in terms of adjustments In the domestic
economy, of course - but it forewent those potential benefits.
Aside from these large swings In the value of the dollar, the instability
In U.S. monetary pollcy and the instability In commodity markets which It
Imposes is still a problem. This 1s Important when considering domestic
commodity stabilization programs, since to carry buffer stocks to offset
fluctuations in the weather is one thing. To carry them, and to manage-21-
them, so as to offset large monetary disturbances IS quite another matter.
We will have more to say on this below.
Finally, it is important to note that not all Brazil’s “wounds” have
been imposed from abroad. Est~mates of the effective protection of Brazil’s
soybean sector in recent years are present In Table 2. The soybean sector
1s interesting In that It IS a commodity In which Braz~l has done reasonably
well in foreign markets m recent years. Moreover, the United States has
been critical of Brazillan trade pollcy, alleging that It has subsidized
Its soybean exports, both implicitly and explicitly.
What the data, shows, however, lS that Brazlllan economic pollcy has
discriminated severely against the soybean sector. Moreover, when the
overvaluation of the cruzerlo is taken into account, the discrimination
has been qu~te serious.
A number of comments w1ll help put these results In perspective. F~rst,
despite the large subsld~es provided to the soybean sector by means of large
negative real rates of Interest, the soybeansectorwas still experienced
a net tax. The components of this tax Include expllcit export taxes,
domestic sales taxes on export commodities, export quotas and embargoes,
and protection of the domest~c fertilizer and modern ~mport sectors.
Second, Braz~l has concentrated on exporting soybean meal. The
observed dlscrlminatlon against the soybean gramsector in past amounts to
a subs~dy for the meal export sector In that lt acts to keep the domestic
price of the bean, raw material lower. Moreover, Brazil has providedTable 2. Effective ProtectIon of Brazlllan Soybean Sector, With and
Without Effect of Distortion In Exchange Rate Taken Into
Account, 1977-83 (Percent)
Excludlng Includlng
Dlstortlon in Distortion In








Source: Ph.D. dlssertatlon, Carlos Santana (In draft)-22-
efficient subsidies for the export of the meal. Whether these were large
enough to effect the other taxes, especially 1s an open question. My
judgement 1s that they were not, but that 1s still a judgement.
Third, Brazil has a very great potential to increase its production of
exports. In the ofsenseof the observed dlscrimlnatlon,Brazll’s output
would have been significantly larger, as would Its exports.
Finally, Brazil has undertaken dramatic realignments in lts exchange
rate this past year and under pressure from the IMF and World Banks, is
reducing and in some case eliminating other distortions In its economy.
In fact, the cruzerio may now be undervalued, rather than over-valued,
and thus acting as an export subsidy. If these changed pollc~es persist,
Braz~l will become a serious threat to the U.S. soybean market.
In conclusion, despite the size of the shocks imposed on Brazil’s
agriculture from external forces, its own domestic, trade, and
rate pollcles have ~nfllcted rather serious economic wounds on
exchange
itself.
Implications of the Changed System for Mexico
Mex~co has experienced some of the same difficulties as Brazil. In
fact, the magnitude of the shocks imposed on Mexico has been even greater
than Ln the case of Brazil since Mexico has tried to operate with a pegged
exchange rate while Brazil’s use of a crawling peg exchange rate enabled It
to take some adjustment as It went along and to avoid becoming completely
out of adjustment.-23-
The pertinent data on the exchange rate are summarized in Flgure3.
Perhaps the most important thing to note is that fixing the nominal exchange
rate when international monetary conditions are changing can impose rather
large changes In the real exchange rate. The shocks imposed m the 1973-76
period are important examples, as 1s the long decllne from 1977 through
1981.
Some of the pertinent data on trade are presented in Tables 3 and ~.
More discussion on these data w1ll be developed at a later point.
A number of observations about the Mexican case seem to be pertinent.
First, lt appears that Mexico benefitted In third-country trade from the
decline in the value of the dollar in the 1971-73 period, and again later In
the 1978-80 period. Second, by 1980 and 1981, the real value of the Mexican
peso appears to be significantly over-valued. This was a subsidy to its
Imports, and a tax on lts export sector. Third, when the dollar started to
rise in late 1980 and In 1981, the peso was at a quite high level in real
terms and actually decllnmg in late 1981. The relative movements were
quite significant - and the impact on third-country trade must have been
quite significant.
The fourth point lS to note the large q onetary disturbances of the
recent years. The fluctuations In the real exchange rate are really quite
large. Not all of these shocks have been transmitted to the trade sectors
of the Xexlcan economy. Price controls on some sectors have been quite
stringent. That has especially been the case in the food and agricultural
sector.,_____-
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Imports of the Main Agricultural Products In Mexico, 1970-1980
Wheat Corn Soybeans
Volume Value Vo1ume Va1ue Volume Value
























































Source: FAO Year ‘t’radebook, several IssuesTable 4
Exports of the Main Agrlcutural Products in Mexico, 1970-1980
cotton Tomatoes Coffee
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Va1ue



































































Source FAO Year Trade Book, several issuesTable 5
Effective Rate of Protection for the
Wheat Sector, Mexico, 1970-82 (Percent)
Ignoring Distortion Taking Account of DIs-














Source: Ph.D. Dlssertationj Jeronimo Ramos-24-
The failure to pass these external shocks through to the real economy
1s a mixed blesslng, of course. On the one hand, It protects some sectors -
at least for a time - from the external disturbances. As a consequence, how-
ever, the required adjustment IS forced on to a narrower segment of the
economy. Moreover, the period required for adjustment will undoubtedly be
longer as a consequence of the failure to reflect the changed economic
conditions to the domestic economy.
Another point that should be recognized - and yet which may be contro-
versial – 1s that the great rise In the value of the dollar creates conditions
for an Inflow of Amer~can capital to flow into Mexico. Put differently,
the incentives for resources to flow out of dollar assets to acquire lower
priced Mexican assets IS qu~te great. The great rise In the real value of
the Mexican peso attenuates these lncentlves, of course. The recent fall
In the value of the peso exacerbates this problem. Restr~ctlons on the
international capital market w1ll probably cont~nue to be used to hold this
capital Inflow at bay.
It IS Important to note, however, that exchange rate disturbances to
Mexican agriculture d~d not start Just with the late 1970’s and early
1980’s, nor were they coming exclusively from abroad. Data In Tables 5 and
5 shed some llght on this issue. Estimates of the effective rate of protec-
tion for corn and wheat are presented in those tables. They show that eco-
nomic policy has discriminated severely against these sectors over the
years , and an Important part of the dlscrlmlnation has been due to the chro-
nic overvaluatlon of the peso vls-a-vis the dollar. Table 5 provides a com-
parison of the estimate of the effective protection with and without the
distortion in the exchange rate. Obviously, that distortion ls important,
but there are other Important factors as well.Table 6
Effective Rate of ProtectIon for Corn Sector,
Corn, Mexicoj 1970-82 (Percent)
Ralnfed Area, No Ralnfed Area, Use
Machinery, Use of Machinery and Irrigated
Modern Inputs Modern Inputs Area
1970 -41 -38 -33
1971 -62 -60 -56
1972 -41 -39 -35
1973 -41 -40 -37
1974 -26 -29 -32
1975 -18 -16 -18
1976 -1 9 7
1977 1 15 11
1978 -19 -lo -12
1979 -15 -4 -8
1980 -7 6 1
1981 10 32 25
1982 30 56 36
Source: Ph.D. Dissertation, Jeronlmo Ramos-25-
Glven that Mexico Imports some of the modern inputs it uses in agri-
culture, there was obviously some benefit from an overvalued exchange rate.
However, the problem was that, at least in the early part of the period,
the use of such modern Inputs was fairly modest, and consequently the nega-
tive effect on the price of the product far outweighed the posltlve effects
on the price of modern inputs. Data In Tables 7 and 8 lndlcate the net
effects of the overvaluatlon of the peso on the prices of inputs and on the
price of the output for wheat and corn, respectively.
To conclude this section, a number of points can be noted. First, had
Mexico not discriminated so severely against its own agriculture by over-
valuing lts currency and other means, Lts recent economic history might have
been very different. Its Lmports of wheat and corn very llkely would have
been slgnlflcantly less, and It’s entirely possible that lt could have been
a net exporter of corn or wheat or both. Slmllarly, lts exports of the com-
modities It has been exporting very llkely would have been slgnlflcantly
more.
In a very real sense, distortions in the exchange rate and other poll-
cles kept Mexico from reallzlng whatever comparative advantage lt might have
had In agriculture. Such pollcles have a very high cost in terms of
Income taxed away lmpllcltly from the producer. Moreover, our previous work
on Brazil suggests that the incidence of this export tax (or import subsidy)
IS largely on the small producer. The large producer has the flexlblllty to
escape at least part of the tax by reorganizing to produce more extensively.
The small producer does not have that opportunity and consequently bears a
disproportionate share of the tax.Table 7
Impact of the Overvaluatlon of the Peso
in the Wheat Market
(Pesos per ton of wheat)
Impliclt Subsidy in














Source: Ph.D. Dissertation, Jeronimo RamosTable 8
Impact of Overvaluation of the Peso
in the Corn Market
(Values in pesos per ton of product)
Input Subsidy in Input Subsidy in Input Subsidy Impllcit



































































Source: Ph.D. Dissertation, Jeronimo Ramos-26-
It should also be noted that had the peso been floating in the late
1970’s and early 1980’s, and had more stable domestic macroeconomic pollcies
been In effect, the real value of the peso might well have risen as petro-
leum exports grew. But a flexible exchange rate and a more open trading
regime might well have spread the adjustment widely In the economy and mini-
mized the shock to Mexican agriculture.
As it was, Mexico had the worst of a difficult situation. The peso was
becoming increasingly overvalued vis-a-vis the dollar at the very time the
dollar was experiencing an unprecedented rise. It is little wonder that the
shock to the Mexican economy has been as great as lt has. Most of this
disturbance came from abroad, and was due to factors over which Mexico had
llttle control. But an important part of lt was also self-~mposed.
Finally, many current discus ions of the Mexican situation have placed
culpability on high U.S. intere~. rates and focused on the cost of credit
alone. However, had the peso been floating in that period, the rise in the
value of the dollar as a consequence of the high interest rates ~n the
United States would have helped Mexico earn the foreign exchange to prevent
or at least attenuate the crlsls which eventually arrived.
Instltutlonal and Policy Implications
The experience from these two countries has some important institu-
tional and pollcy implications, not only for these two countries but more
generally as well. The first 1s that In the kind of world we now live in,
rather slzeable external shocks can be imposed on individual economies -
shocks that have little to do with domestic pollcies or developments in the
domestic economy. That is an important implication of the increased econo-
mic integration which now characterizes the international economy.-27-
These shocks are transmitted through the trade sector, the inter-
national capital markets, and realignments of real exchange rates. I would
stress the importance of the international capital markets and the exchange
rate. Countries like Brazil and Mexico, which have pursued autarchic,
import-substituting industrialization policles, and in the case of Mexico,
controls on foreign capital, have still found themsell
external shocks that were beyond their control.
It is important to recognize how much our econom:
trying to understand some of these developments. For
es victimized by
c world has changed in
example, many obser-
vers of the U.S. scene expect the dollar to decline because we are running a
large deficit on the trade account. What they don’t seem to recognize is
that It is the lnternat~onal capital market that 1s now drlvzng the system.
The dollar is strong because of what is taking place in the capital market.
And our trade deficit is a consequence of our strong dollar, not something
that 1s likely to make It weak.
The real issue many countries face today is whether they can really
Isolate themselves from the international economy even if they should want
to. The costs of so doing are obviously quite great. Few countries would
really want to sacrifice the opportunities offered by trade and the inter-
national capital market the current international economy now offers them.
Their sacrifice in terms of foregone Income would be quite great.
To take advantage of the new system WI1l obviously require some impor-
tant changes in country pollcies. The by-word for the future is most llkely
“flexlbllity.” The experience with U.S. commodity programs lS a perfect
example. Large rises in the value of the dollar in the context of fixed-28-
commodlty prices has caused U.S. commodities to be pr~ced out of tnter-
natlonal markets and large surpluses to accumulate at home.
In general, It is probably counterproductive in today’s kind of world
to flx nominal exchange rates. Dlstortxons creep in very quickly when the
value of other currencies 1s changing significantly. The adjustment costs
are then all Imposed at one time, and they can be very significant.
It should also be noted that adjustment pollcies take on much greater
importance in more open, well-integrated economies. Economies will need to
be adjusted to rapidly changing international realitles. The politlcal and
economic payoff from facilitating that adjustment is quite high.
Finally, we all need to give a great deal more attention to reforming,
1
changing, and creating our international institutions. The simple fact of
the matter ~s that our economic integration has far outpaced our polltlcal
integration and our lnstltutlonal arrangements to manage and cope with that
integration. We are on a road to disaster lf we don’t bring our polltlcal
and institutional arrangements along with out economic integration. The
less-developed South has been telling us that for some years now. We in the
industrialized North need to open our mind and ears, and muster the creati-
vity and political WI1l to bring about the changes we need.
.
~For some suggestions, see Schuh, G. Edward, “Towards Reform of our
International Monetary and Trade Instltutlons,” in Issues In Third World
Development, edited by Kenneth C. Nobe and Rajan K. Sampath, Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, 1983.-29-
Concluding Comments
We llve In a very different world than we llved in 15 to 20 years ago.
Pollcles and institutional arrangements proper for that period are no longer
proper today. We need to learn that lesson. We also need to do something
about It.
The world as a whole has gained significantly from the increased econo-
mic integration that has evolved during the post-World War II period. We
could slide back into a world of autarchy, economic warfare, and chaos,
especially If we don’t address the problem of our international institutions
and polltlcal arrangements. As analysts and researchers, we need to give
these problems our highest priority.